ACMA ABSTRACT • SPRING 2007

 

Statutory Equitable Subrogation

by Roger Bernhardt

 

Let me describe a recent case first, and then tell you what I would do about it.

In Countrywide Home Loans v. First National Bank of Steamboat Springs, Supreme Court of Wyoming, 144 P.3d 1224, Oct. 17, 2006. The Ketchams gave a first mortgage on their prop­erty to AWL in 1997. Then in 2002, they gave a second mortgage to First National Bank. And in April 2003, they gave a third mortgage to Countrywide for a loan which was used to pay off the AWL mortgage. (it is too bad that First Bank had to be holding a second mortgage, but I will avoid continuing the confusion by referring to the three lenders as AWL (A), Bank (B) and Countrywide (C)). All three mortgages were promptly recorded when they were executed, and Countrywide knew of the Bank’s mortgage; it apparently assumed that it would take priority over it by stepping into AWL’s shoes.

Later that year the Ketchams defaulted on their Bank mortgage, and the Bank sued to foreclose, naming Countrywide as a defendant. Bank and Countrywide both claimed priority over each other. Bank’s claim was based upon the Wyoming recording act, which dates priority from date of recordation and meant that Bank’s earlier recorded mortgage came before Countrywide’s later recorded one.

Countrywide’s counter claim to priority was based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, promul­gated by the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) in 1997. Section 7.6 provides:

“(a) One who fully performs an obliga­tion of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Even though the perfor­mance would otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage, they are preserved and the mortgage retains its priority in the hands of the subrogee.” HARTFORD 150533v2

Countywide claimed that it fit the Restatement standard because: 1) it, and the borrowers, and the original lender all expected it to have first pri­ority; 2) it would not have agreed to re-finance otherwise; 3) Bank’s posi­tion would not be lowered; 4) Bank should not move up in priority sim­ply because Countrywide knew of its mortgage when it paid off the AWL mortgage; and 5) this gave Bank an “inappropriate windfall”.

Countrywide’s arguments fell on deaf ears. The trial court saw no reason to give Countrywide the protection that it could easily have gotten for itself by either asking for a subordina­tion agreement from First National Bank or an assignment from AWL, whereas to allow it to leapfrog over Bank would amount to an unjust enrichment that it had done nothing to deserve.The Wyoming Supreme Court felt even more strongly that equitable subrogation should not be allowed. It quoted extensively from its earlier decisions to show that it had fully accepted as one of the “great principles of equity” the idea that one who is compelled to satisfy a superior lien in order to protect his own lien should be subrogated to the rights of the superior lien holder. But that prin­ciple does not require extending the doctrine, as the Restatement does, “to allow a refinancing mortgagee to step into the shoes of a prior mortgagee for purposes of obtaining lien prior­ity.” The refinancer does not pay the debt because of its good conscience or because it is necessary to protect its own interest, but rather as a volun­teer. “In our view equitable subroga­tion simply has no application where a financial institution extends a loan for the purpose of enabling a mort­gagor to pay off an existing mortgage, knowing that a subordinate lien exists on the real estate.”

Given the lack of any equitable com­pulsion, there was no reason to reject the express demand of the recording statute that priority go to the party who has recorded first. “Countrywide was charged with knowing Wyoming is a “first in time” jurisdiction. We are charged with the duty of giving effect to the statutes our legislature has enacted. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the court has no right to look for and impose another meaning, but has the duty to give full force and effect to the legislative product.” The statute’s primary purpose of securing certainty of title “outweighs the interests of private lending institutions which can be protected by simple due dili­gence.” So Countryside lost.

The Wyoming Supreme Court is not alone in refusing to accept the Restatement’s argument that equi­table subrogation ought to be avail­able to refinancers even when they know or have constructive notice of intervening other creditors. A quick search of post 1997 decisions shows that courts in Florida (Picker Financial Group L.L.C. v. Horizon Bank, 293 B.R. 253,, M.D.Fla.2003), Kansas (Bankers Trust Co. v. U.S., 25 P.3d 877, .2001), Minnesota (Ripley v. Piehl, 700 N.W.2d 540 2005), Pennsylvania.(First Com. Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 2004), and Washington (Kim v. Lee, 145 Wash.2d 79, 31 P.3d 665, 2001) have reached the same result.

Against these six jurisdictions, the Restatement lists seven on its side: Arizona (Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 208 Ariz. 478, 95 P.3d 542, 2004), Colorado (Hicks v. Londre, 125 P.3d 452, 2005), DC (Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Pappas, 829 A.2d 953. 2003), Florida (Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat. Bank of Florida, 792 So.2d 1222, 2001), Indiana (Bank of New York v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 2005), Massachusetts, East Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 428 Mass. 327, 701 N.E.2d 331, 1998), Nevada (Houston v. Bank of America Federal Savings Bank, 119 Nev. 485, 78 P.3d 71, 2003). Seven to six does not quite add up to an overwhelming victory for this new “enlightened” position.

What separates the courts on this issue is, I think, a difference between eco­nomics and morals. Restatementers see the intervening creditor as suf­fering no economic harm when its junior loan remains no less junior, merely subject to a different senior. Traditional moralists, on the other hand, will not forgive refinancing lenders for their audacity in wanting to leapfrog over existing creditors who they knew about but were too careless to deal with properly. Those are deepseated differences, not likely to be overcome when a real dispute has already arisen.

However, it seems to me that the mat­ter is much more easily resolved if we view it in the abstract under a com­plete veil of ignorance as to which side we might be, rather than from the afterthought perspective of a judge who knows what everybody did. If C’s funds are used to pay off A’s debt, does fairness require that C be below B if C knew of B but above C if he did not? How does fairness to B or C depend on C’s knowledge? What has B done to deserve an elevation of priority, or is that unjust enrichment? Does C’s knowledge or carelessness justify his being denied A’s original priority or is that punitive damages? If you don’t know that your client will be B or C, which rule would you want to have in your jurisdiction?

A prudent refinancing lender will of course ask for an assignment from the old senior or for a subordination from the existing junior (who, how­ever, in many of the cases appeared to be a judgment creditor rather than a consensual lender, and therefore less likely to agree). That is a wise pre­caution, but it does not deal with the problem of the lender who fails to be so prudent. Jack Murray, writing in DIRT, urged refinancers to have their loan documents declare the mutual intention of lender and borrower that the new loan take the original prior­ity of the loan it is paying off. That too may help by bringing the matter closer to “conventional” subrogation if equitable subrogation is denied, but it will still require a court to be sym­pathetic – as the Wyoming and others are too often not.

I think this is one of those cases where legislation is appropriate. ACMA should consider pushing for a model act based on the Restatement: one who fully performs another’s obliga­tion should become by subrogation owner of the obligation and its secu­rity to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. It is difficult to imagine who would oppose this in the abstract. As a rule with statutory effect, it would be far more effective than all the best language in the world in the loan documents.

I think it not likely that refinanc­ers would get careless in their title searches or lending habits if they knew that equitable subrogation was always available. Winning that way would still leave them at the mercy of litigation and uncertainty. This would only be damage control for those (too frequent) cases where someone below has messed up.

Lender's Forecloser May Curtail Collection

Against Other Collateral

by: Harris Ominsky*

A recent United States District Court decision illustrates how the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act can tie the hands of a foreclos­ing lender when it tries to collect on other collateral that it holds. In that case, Chief U.S. District Judge Harvey Bartle, III held that a bank could not recover proceeds paid on a second mortgage held by the bank on another property owned by the borrowers. That collection was “barred” because the bank had foreclosed on another prop­erty owned by the borrowers which it had taken over at the Sheriff’s sale. Luis Munoz and Deborah Munoz v. Sovereign Bank (U.S. D.C. E.D. Pa., Civil Action No. 06-2876, September 18, 2006).

On the face of it, the decision does not seem surprising because the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act is designed to protect borrowers against lenders who acquire a borrow­er’s property upon foreclosure, and still proceed to collect the debt with­out full credit for the acquired prop­erty. The Pennsylvania Act is similar to many other consumer protection acts inspired over seventy years ago by depression tactics used by lenders to take advantage of defaulting bor­rowers by foreclosing on their homes and then continuing to dun the unfor­tunate homeowners for collection of the debt without proper credit for the value of the acquired homes.

Two Mortgages

However, the use of the Deficiency Judgment Act in the Munoz case may surprise and alarm some lenders, and should inspire more thought about how lenders should proceed after default when they are fortunate to have more than one piece of collateral for the loan.

In that case the borrowers sought a declaratory judgment that the bank had violated the Deficiency Judgment Act when it collected proceeds from a sale of a second property on which it held a second mortgage. As stated by the court, the borrowers defaulted on a loan from Sovereign Bank secured by a commercial property and a going business at 4401 Castor Avenue in Philadelphia. The bank started fore­closure and obtained a default judg­ment for $1,116,000.00 against the borrowers and their business. At the Sheriff’s sale the bank purchased the property for $31,000.00 and received a Sheriff’s Deed which was recorded on September 24, 2005. Borrowers’ residential property in Moorestown, New Jersey was then sold four months later in a judicial sale by the first mortgage holder; and Sovereign, which held the second mortgage on that property, received $587,000.00 from that sale toward the satisfaction of its earlier judgment.

The borrowers alleged that the bank failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act because it continued to execute on their residen­tial property without crediting the fair market value of the previously sold property to the balance due on that judgment. The court pointed out that under the Act creditors must file a peti­tion with the court to fix the fair mar­ket value of the real property within six months of the sale, and that period begins on the date the Deed is deliv­ered to the lender. If the lender fails to file a petition to fix the fair value within the six month period, the court must mark the judgment satisfied.

The bank argued that it had not violated the Act. First, it did not take action against the borrowers’ residential property in New Jersey on which the first lender had foreclosed. The money it received resulted from the proceeds at Sheriff’s sale of another foreclosure by a senior lender. Secondly, at the time that residential property was sold the bank still had two months to peti­tion the court to fix the fair value of the Castor Avenue property under the terms of the Act.

Fair Market Value

Judge Bartle rejected the bank’s argu­ments and held:

The six month period a creditor has to file a petition to fix fair market value under the Act does not give the creditor a six month window in which to under­mine the protection the Act affords a debtor. The creditor during that period is not given carte blanche to collect the difference between the judgment and the price which the creditor paid at the sheriff’s sale of the first property sub­ject to foreclosure… Without a court first determining the fair market value of the commercial property on Castor Avenue, it is impossible to know what, if any, deficiency remains in the judg­ment against the plaintiffs.

If one looks at the legislative intent of the Deficiency Judgment Act, the court’s reasoning is not unreasonable. Unless the lender has gone through the procedure to set fair market value, there is arguably no way to protect bor­rowers against a bank double dipping. If the bank winds up with the property foreclosed upon, conceivably it could have an asset worth more than the full debt, so when the second property is sold, it could be unfair for it to get paid anything more towards the debt.

The court then held that the borrow­ers’ petition for declaratory judgment should survive the bank’s motion to dis­miss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That means that the borrowers’ claim for breach of contract, conversion and fraud may now be litigated.

Superior Court Precedent

The problem with the District Court’s opinion is that it seems to be contra to the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Horbal v. Moxham National Bank, 657 A. 2d 1261 (Pa. Super 1995) where a majority of the Court held that the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act did not act to bar a bank from cashing in on additional security after the bank had foreclosed the loan and taken over the real estate. In that case the additional collateral was a Certificate of Deposit and therefore the Horbal case may be distinguishable, because the majority maintained that the bank’s right to pos­session of the CD proceeds predated the purchase of the real estate at the Sheriff’s sale. However, in reaching that conclusion, the majority rejected the bank’s argument that the liquida­tion of the CD was proper because it occurred within six months of the sale and receipt of the Deed, which was within the time allowed before a defi­ciency needs to be established.

According to the dissent in Horbal, the majority opinion had rejected that argument, and the dissent maintained that it was necessary for the bank to file a petition before it sought recovery of any additional property. This losing argument by the dissent seems to be the same argument now adopted by Judge Bartle.

The Horbal case is not mentioned in this Sovereign Bank decision and one is left to wonder whether the District Court has elected to distinguish that case or merely ignore it, even though the earlier case is a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision which inter­prets a Pennsylvania statute.

Unanswered Questions

One of the questions which is unan­swered by the Sovereign Bank deci­sion is what will finally happen to the $587,000.00 which the bank was paid from the sale of the New Jersey residential property. Remember, Sovereign Bank apparently did not take any action to create those pro­ceeds. It merely received payment as a result of a sale triggered by another party because Sovereign Bank held the second mortgage on the sold property. Nothing in the Deficiency Judgment Act provides for secured liens to be terminated as a result of a foreclosure sale. The Act speaks only of what hap­pens to the debt which may be secured by other liens or encumbrances.

Perhaps as the case proceeds, the court may still permit Sovereign Bank to petition for fair value, and if the fair value of the Castor Avenue property is less than the total debt, any short-fall or deficiency can be made up by all or part of the $587,000.00 proceeds from the sale of the New Jersey residence.

In light of the uncertainty about how the Pennsylvania Deficiency Act affects lenders’ rights to proceeds from other collateral, foreclosing banks should seriously consider whether they want to proceed against the other collateral that they hold before they complete a foreclosure on a defaulted loan. That foreclosure could force them into fair value litigation that might last for years before they are able to collect on the other collateral. For example, if the bank had held off the foreclo­sure on Castor Avenue while the other lender foreclosed on the New Jersey residential property, it could have received the $587,000.00 from that sale, and applied it against the debt without having to go through a defi­ciency judgment procedure.

December 21, 2006

The American Bar Association recently published Mr. Ominsky’s book, “Real Estate Lore: Modern Techniques and Everyday Tips for the Practitioner.”

“Relation Back” of Exercise of Option–Are There Exceptions?

Continued from page 11

Update on Uniform Acts

continued from page 8

2006-2007 ACMA COMMITTEES


Executive Committee

E. Howell Crosby, Chair

Edward T. Bullard

Nyal D. Deems

Mark A. Manulik

John C. Murray

Beverly I. Levy, Ex Officio

Budget Committee

Edward T. Bullard, Chair

Nyal D. Deems

E. Howell Crosby

Robert J. Krapf

Mark A. Manulik

James F. Morrow

John C. Murray

Robert J. Pinstein

Norma J. Williams

Beverly I. Levy, Ex Officio

Business Development Committee

Edward T. Bullard, Chair

Stephen M. Alden

Craig B. Anderson

James A. Bradford

Matthew J. Comisky

Hardin G. Halsey

Grace N. Kido

David N. Lombard

Stephen H. Malato

Frank M. Mock

Thomas J. Trent

By-Laws Committee

A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Chair

Jean L. Bertrand

James R. Conway, III

W. Charles Rogers, III.

John G. Serino

Glenn H. Steele, Jr.

Corporate Counsel Committee

Robert C. Woodcock, Chair

Cheryl P. Armata

Leo J. Buchignani, Jr.

Jeanne Irwin

Peter M. Jordan

Gretchen Lengel Kelly

Thomas L. Martin

David B. McCain

William L. McCown

Diane R. Palecek

Susan T. Robbins

Legislation Committee

Norma J. Williams, Chair

W. Rodney Clement, Jr.

Jay F. Cook

Francis L. Keldermans

Robert J. Krapf

Malcolm A. Meyer

Andrew F. Palmieri

Douglas J. Smart

Eric P. Stauffer

Steven H. Winkler

Meetings Committee

E. Howell Crosby, Chair

R. Keith Colvin

Nyal D. Deems

David N. Lombard

Mark A. Manulik

Beverly I. Levy

Membership Committee

Nyal D. Deems, Chair

Alfred G. Adams

Stephen A. Bromberg

Edward T. Bullard

E. Howell Crosby

J. Tim Konold

Mark A. Manulik

John C. Murrray

Robert J. Pinstein

Robert J. Krapf, Ex Officio

Donald A. Shindler, Ex Officio

Beverly I. Levy, Ex Officio

Membership Development Committee

Donald A. Shindler, Chair

Cheryl P. Armata, Vice Chair

R. Keith Colvin

William B. Dunn

John D. Hastie

John L. Hosack

E. Andrew Keeney

Michael G. Kerman

J. Tim Konold

Robert J. Krapf

Gregory L. Leatherbury, Jr.

Gail E. McCann

William L. McCown

T. Mary McDonald

Kathleen O. McKune

James F. Morrow

Jacob W. Reby

Norman H. Roos

Robert W. Sargeant

Natalie J. Stucky

Robert E. Wood

National Mortgage Law Summary Committee

M. Lawrence Hicks, Jr., Chair

Craig B. Anderson

Jerry A. Creim

E. Andrew Keeney

Cheryl A. Kelly

Mark A. Manulik

Sam J. McAllester, III.

William P. McCaughan

Laura L. McClellan

John V. Rider

Robert W. Sargeant

William W. Schroeder

Nominating Committee

E. Howell Crosby, Chair

Alfred Adams

Stephen A. Bromberg

J. Tim Konold

Mark A. Manulik

John C. Murray

Robert J. Pinstein

Opinions Committee

James F. Morrow, Chair

Steven M. Alden

Jay F. Cook

William B. Dunn

Catherine T. Goldberg

M. Lawrence Hicks, Jr.

Robert A. Holmes

Cheryl A. Kelly

Robert J. Krapf

Douglas A. Prince

Carl J. Seneker, II.

Lawrence J. Wolk

Program Committee

John L. Hosack, Co-Chair

William L. McCown, Co-Chair

Dena M. Cruz, Co-Chair

Cheryl P. Armata

Leo J. Buchignani, Jr.

Matthew J. Comisky

John W. Daniels, Jr.

Scott A. Farrimond

Nancy R. Little

Sam J. McAllester, III.

Kathleen O. McKune

James F. Morrow

Harris Ominsky

J. Stephen Werts

Publications Committee

Norman H. Roos, Chair

Craig B. Anderson

Roger Bernhardt

W. Rodney Clement, Jr.

Richard R. Goldberg

Nancy R. Little

Kathleen O. McKune

John C. Murray

Harris Ominsky

Ruth M. Schifani

State Chair Coordinator

Robert J. Krapf. Chair

Strategic Planning Committee

R. Keith Colvin, Chair

Stephen A. Bromberg

Edward T. Bullard

E. Howell Crosby

Nyal D. Deems

David N. Lombard

Mark A. Manulik

Darlene T. Marsh

David B. McCain

John C. Murray

Technology/Website Committee

Matthew J. Comisky, Chair

Robert A. Holmes

Roger D. Hughey

Leopold Z. Sher

James C. Wine

Steven H. Winkler

Alan Steven Wolf

Title Insurance Committee

Scott A. Abney, Chair

Nancy J. Appleby

Michael J. Berey

Robert S. Bozarth

Jeffery W. Blitz

Frederic W. Clark

Dena M. Cruz

John B. D’Agostino

Scott A. Farrimond

James L. Gosdin

Paul L. Hammann

L. Christian Harrell, III

John L. Hosack

Gregory L. Leatherbury, Jr.

Edward J. Lieberman

William P. McCaughan

Frank M. Mock

John C. Murray

Robert W. Sargeant

Steven H. Winkler

Robert E. Wood


IN MEMORIAM

MEMBERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PLAN


Mission Statement

To create and effectuate a membership strat­egy for growth and retention of qualified membership in the American College of Mortgage Attorneys.

Proposals and Goals

1. Evaluate current membership on a state-by-state basis with the cooperation of the State and Provincial Chairs to determine activity and interest levels of the Fellows in each jurisdiction.

2. Communicate membership status levels (e.g. active, inactive) available to watch needs and interest levels of Fellows.

3. Establish an immediate goal that each State and Provincial Chair identify, con­sider, and track prospective qualified can­didates and conduct an annual analysis of each state’s and province’s membership to determine numbers, diversity, level of interest and activity levels of the member­ship in the applicable state or province.

4. Achieve more extensive geographic dis­tribution throughout the U.S. and Canada with the goal to be a truly continental organization.

a. Highlight the states and provinces with minimal numbers of members and seek to assure quality, representative Fellows in each state and province.

b. Seek greater or more proportionate repre­sentation in major metropolitan areas.

c. Address directed recruitment efforts in underrepresented areas, such as all states and provinces where membership is minimal (0 to 5) or membership is weighted with inactive Fellows and those approaching retirement. Further, cities such as Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Denver, Washington D.C., and other major cities all need to be considered and membership numbers and concentrations addressed.

d. Consider membership levels in heavily represented areas in connection with qual­ified nominations from such areas.

5. Qualified attorneys and leaders of the real estate and financing bars should be sought as expansion into lesser represented loca­tions occurs, recognizing that identifica­tion and recruitment of qualified diverse candidates initially may be difficult.

6. Diversity of age, gender, race and ethnic­ity should be important factors in mem­bership recruitment goals and efforts.

7. Address the major law firm and multiple offices issue with respect to membership. Recognize and formulate an approach to the “facts of life” concerning large regional and national law firms and the nature of real estate and real estate financ­ing practices to provide flexibility rather than imposition of inflexible numeric limits to aid in achievement of ACMA’s enunciated goals, while at the same time balancing the desire of ACMA to have a diverse membership in all jurisdictions.

8. Address the fact that networking and the opportunities for business development are important to the Fellows and accord­ingly seek members from in-house coun­sel, recognizing that in many in-house corporate structures some of the tradi­tional avenues of activity, expression and identification of prospective mem­bers and leaders of the bar are not read­ily available and that active participation can be hampered by the reimbursement policies of companies.

9. Consider governmental and non-govern­mental organization attorneys, recogniz­ing that in these types of organizations some of the traditional avenues of activity, expression and identification of prospec­tive members and leaders of the bar are not readily available.

10. Complete and distribute an annual statis­tical report reflecting the breakdown of membership throughout the College for analysis and measurement of membership goal achievement. The first step to achiev­ing goals is to set them and then measure progress toward such achievement and such reports could be a useful tool.

11. Coordinate efforts with the Member-ship Committee, the Strategic Planning Committee and the State and Provincial Chairs.

12. Keep in mind in all of these goals that the overarching goal is to recruit not merely highly qualified practitioners, but men and women who fit well within the spirit of collegiality and friendship that ACMA has attained and maintains.

Stanley H. McCalla, Sr., the first President of ACMA, passed away at age 85 on Thursday, November 23, 2006 at his home in Delray Beach. Mr. McCalla formerly was general and legislative counsel for the Mortgage Bankers Assn. of Georgia and the Atlanta Mortgage Bankers Assn. Mr. McCalla was the recipient of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America Annual State & Local Service Award in 1997 for outstanding services to the mortgage banking industry which is granted to only one member per year; the recipient of the Charles R. Edwards Award from the Loan Administration Committee of the Mortgage Bankers Assn of Georgia in 1986 for dedicated service to the mortgage banking indus­try, being the only non-regular mem­ber to receive this award; recipient of an award from the MBAG in 1991 in grateful appreciation for twenty years service; and recipient of an award from the Board of Governors of the MBAG in 1996 for years of dedicated service to the MBAG and the mortgage indus­try & was granted Lifetime Honorary Member of the association.

According to Past President Charlton H. Carpenter, “Stan, and a handful of others, were the ‘George Washingtons’ of ACMA. He was a good man, and I remember him favorably. He must have been quite proud of what he hath wrought with ACMA as it has excelled and expanded geographically and oth­erwise over the years.”


IN MEMORIAM

ACMA NEW FELLOWS ADMITTED IN MARCH, 2007

Shokrina Radpour Beering

Cohen & Malad, LLP

One Indiana Square, Suite 1400

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Phone: 317/636-6481 Fax: 317/636-2593

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Craig R. Carter

Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP

66 Wellington St, West, Suite 4200

Toronto Dominion Bank Tower

Toronto , ON M5K 1N6

Phone: 416/ 865-4359

Linda S. Finley

Gambrell & Stolz LLP

Monarch Plaza, Suite 1600

3414 Peachtree Road

Atlanta, GA 30326

Phone: 404/589-3408 Fax: 404/221-6501

Gary A. Goodman

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP

1221 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10020-1089

Phone: 212/768-6916 Fax: 212/768-6800

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Jon J. Hoganson

Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.

225 South Sixth Street, Suite 3500

Minneapolis, MN 55402

Phone: 612/604-6745 Fax: 612/604-6845

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Michael S. Kurtzon

Schwartz Cooper Chartered

180 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2700

Chicago, IL 60601

Phone: 312/516-4495 Fax: 312/264-2449

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

John A. Lewis

Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C.

5414 Pinnacle Point Drive, Suite 500

Rogers, AR 72758

Phone: 479/464-5656 Fax: 479/464-5686

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Paul McCarten

Borden Ladner Gervais LLP

Suite 4100 - Scotia Plaza

Toronto, ON M5H 3Y4

Phone: 416/267-6230 Fax: 416/361/2464

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Thomas J. Miraglia

Capmark Financial Group

116 Welsh Road

Horsham, PA 19044

Phone: 215/328-3681 Fax: 215/682-0766

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Lynn Ramsay, Q.C.

Miller Thomson LLP

Robson Court, 840 Howe Street

Vancouver Province, BC V6Z 2M1

Phone: 604/687-2242 Fax: 604/643-1200

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Mary S. Ranum

Fredrikson & Bryon, P.A.

200 South Sixth Street, Suite 4000

Minneapolis, MN 55402-1425

Phone: 612/492-7072 Fax: 612/492-7077

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Joanne M. Schreiner

Dinsmore & Shohl LLP

255 East Fifth Street

Cincinnati, OH 45202

Phone: 513/977-8482 Fax: 513/977-8141

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

William R. (“Pat”) Patterson died on March 1, 2007 at the age of 83. Pat was a Fellow for many years, and served as President of ACMA in 1986.

His list of leadership positions is almost endless. In addition to his ser­vice to ACMA, Pat was a member and served on the Board of Governors of ACREL. He was a founding Trustee of the Southern Federal Tax Institute and served as a Trustee for 33 years. Pat was the former President of the Duke Law School Alumni Association and served as Chairman of the Duke Law School Board of Visitors for 15 years. In 1998, Pat became the third recipi­ent of the George Pindar Award for Lifetime Achievement, an award given by the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia to its most dis­tinguished real estate practitioners. In 2000, Pat became the eighth recipient of the Charles Rhyne Award, a special award by Duke Law School given to its most distinguished alumni.

Pat ended many meetings by reciting some of his famous witticisms, in a style reminiscent of Mark Twain, with “Laws” about human nature and the human spirit. His law practice, his ser­vice, and his life were filled with mod­esty, grace, humor and class. Pat is sur­vived by his wife Lee, three children, and four grandchildren.

CONGRATULATIONS TO

Donald A. Shindler of Chicago, Illlinois, for referring business to the most num­ber of ACMA Fellows during the 2006 year. A total of 177 referrals were made. 31 ACMA attorneys referred a total of 97 other ACMA attorneys. 27 of these referrals were made by Don Shindler. Since Don referred the most number of ACMA attor­neys in 2006, he was presented a check to refund his 2006 ACMA Annual Meeting Registration Fees. Congratulations Don!


AMERICAN COLLEGEOF MORTGAGE ATTORNEYS

15245 Shady Grove Road, Suite 130

Rockville, Maryland 20850


Board of Regents Meeting

April 27-28, 2007

Nantucket, Massachusetts

The White Elephant

SAVE THE DATE

ACMA Annual Meeting

October 4-6, 2007

Aspen, Colorado

St. Regis Aspen

301 990 9075 www.acmaatty.org